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Abstract: ! e article introduces
a  thematic issue of the journal 
! eory of Science that attempts to
revive the category of “philosophi-
cal toys” – objects and instruments
designed for experimental scienti# c 
research that simultaneously played 
crucial role in the creation of the
modern visual culture. It claims that 
to fully understand their nature and 
the kind of experience philosophical 
toys induce, it is necessary to situate
their origins in eighteenth-century 
experimental science and aesthetics
and proposes to approach them as
perceptual and cognitive extensions.
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Tomáš Dvořák
! e term “philosophical toy” was used in the " rst half of the nineteenth 
century to designate a speci" c family of artifacts with a dual ambition: to 
examine various phenomena experimentally and to provide popular amuse-
ment. ! ey were mostly simpli" ed or derivative versions of scienti" c instru-
ments that spread among the lay public and became sought-a$ er consumer 
goods, modern, awe-inspiring curiosities. ! is issue of ! eory of Science
seeks to analyze the speci" c position that philosophical toys occupied – at 
the boundaries of science, arts and popular culture, in between theory and 
practice, knowledge and amusement – and to describe cultural forms that 
populate these thresholds in today’s culture.
In this introduction, I will attempt to capture the nature and functions 
of philosophical toys through a combination of perspectives of three con-
temporary authors from di% erent " elds, whom I " nd most inspiring for both 
the historical analysis of this phenomenon and its contemporary relevance. 
Triangulation of these perspectives will reveal some of the distortions they 
entail; I will try to address them in a seemingly paradoxical maneuver – by 
descending into the material culture of the science and aesthetics of the 
second half of the eighteenth century.
Nicholas Wade is a psychologist specializing in research of vision and 
visuality, both contemporary and historical. He is interested chie& y in optical 
philosophical toys and their role in the history of experimental physiology 
and psychology, as well as in their in& uence on the visual arts. Although Wade 
emphasizes the fact that unlike “philosophical instruments” (instruments 
of the natural philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that 
served the purposes of demonstration and experimental analysis) philosophi-
cal toys are meant to be also amusing and accessible to the broader public, his 
accounts are essentially limited to the development, use and interpretation 
of these contrivances within the scienti" c realm: they constitute a neglected 
chapter in the history of science. By “public” Wade typically means artists, 
namely painters, for whom questions of vision are also essential. His contri-
bution rests primarily in his detailed account of philosophical toys (such as 
the kaleidoscope, thaumatrope, phenakistiscope, stroboscope, stereoscope, 
tachiscope...) and their roles in nineteenth-century scienti" c research on the 
perception of colors, space, depth, movement or time.1
1 Nicholas J. WADE, “Philosophical Instruments and Toys: Optical Devices Extending the 
Art of Seeing.” Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, vol. 13, 2004, no. 1, pp. 102–124
and Nicholas J. WADE, “Toying with Science.” Perception, vol. 33, 2004, no. 9, pp. 1025–1032.
! is article was supported by grant no. P401/11/2338 “Contemporary Approaches in Historical 
Epistemology” from the Czech Science Foundation.
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A very similar set of devices is discussed by Jonathan Crary, a histo-
rian of art and visual culture. In his Foucaldian attempt at rewriting the 
traditional historiographies of art and media, Crary introduces a  radical 
historical break, a discontinuity between the classical and modern regimes 
of vision, between the classical and modern spectator. " e period of sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries is characterized by the camera obscura 
as both a material device and a discursive # gure: it is a concrete technical 
artifact and a dominant epistemological model (embraced by empiricists as 
well as rationalists) that de# ned the status and capabilities of a perceiving 
subject. " e camera obscura model was based on a radical di$ erentiation of 
the inside from the outside, on the separation of the dark interior of the hu-
man mind from the luminous outside world that penetrates inside through 
the aperture of the senses and so depicts its own image. " e outside model 
and its inside copy correspond to each other, and it is the mechanism of the 
camera obscura and its physical principles that guarantee the objectivity of 
the projection. Experimental physiology developed in the early nineteenth 
century breaks with this model in an essential way when it begins to conceive 
of vision in terms of bodily and temporal processes. Goethe’s or Purkinje’s 
investigations of a% erimages begin to delineate the conception of subjective 
vision, imagery produced by the human body that lacks any correlate in the 
outside world. It is the various optical apparatuses that according to Crary 
play crucial role in research and control of such visual experience. " anks 
to them the referential illusion could have become the subject of popular 
entertainment as well. In the simplest form we can # nd it in a thaumatrope, 
a device that utilizes the persistence of vision: two di$ erent yet complemen-
tary images are painted on the front and reverse side of a paper disc (such as 
a bold head and a wig, a bird and a cage ...), which is attached to a stick or two 
pieces of rope and by twisting them fast enough the two images combine. 
" is way anyone could realize that the resulting visual impression is not 
really what is in front of us, that the human senses generate optical illusions 
thanks to their “fallibility”. Crary devotes most attention to the stereoscope, 
the “quintessentially nineteenth-century device” and the source of the most 
realistic e$ ect in the mass culture of that time. " e principle of stereoscopy 
is “based on a radical abstraction and reconstruction of optical experience”,2
it is the result of the separation and isolation of individual senses, their 
2 Jonathan CRARY, Techniques of the Observer. On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth
Century. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1990, p. 9.
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scienti! c analysis and targeted and controlled irritation by mechanical 
instruments.
Film historian and theorist Tom Gunning published several brilliant 
studies about (again, particularly optical) philosophical toys. I regard these 
studies as the most inspiring contributions to the topic so far, because they 
actually situate the toys within the realm of popular culture (Crary’s account 
follows mainly shi# s in the conceptualization of vision in the works of intel-
lectual elites, philosophical toys being their secondary illustrations) and also 
regard them as a constitutive moment of modern and contemporary media 
culture, a tendency still present and e$ ective that intersects with and supple-
ments other visual forms and conventions. % e starting point for Gunning’s 
interest in these proto-cinematographic devices is his radical reassessment 
of early cinema, expressed in the conception of “the cinema of attraction” 
from 1986. Until then, the historiography and theory of ! lm were dominated 
by a narrative understanding of ! lm that was unable to adequately grasp its 
early phase (until about 1906), which was taken to be a groping, undevel-
oped, primitive ! lm form still in search of its true media-speci! c narrative 
nature. However, according to Gunning, the cinema of attraction is guided 
by very di$ erent principles, it is based on making images seen, harnessing 
visibility and exhibiting both the ! lmic illusion and the ! lm technology. He 
sees early cinema “less as a way of telling stories than as a way of present-
ing a  series of views to an audience, fascinating because of their illusory 
power [...] and exoticism.”3 It is necessary to point out that this exhibitionist 
impulse does not evaporate from cinema even a# er the classical, narrative 
form takes over; it rather becomes a kind of submerged stream that feeds 
avant-garde ! lm and o# en surfaces into mainstream cinema, just like today 
in the form of special e$ ects or so-called 3D, 4D, and 5D cinema. Later, 
Gunning searches for these aspects of ! lm understood in terms of a  fair 
attraction or a parlor trick in the popular visual culture of the nineteenth 
century. Philosophical toys and their “technological images” based on the 
manipulation of human perception through mechanical devices give rise to 
the modern image culture, at once profoundly technological and perceptual. 
% anks to its simplicity, thaumatrope serves as Gunning’s ! rst and foremost 
example of this new phenomenon:
3  Tom GUNNING, “% e Cinema of Attraction: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde.” 
Wide Angle, vol. 8, 1986, no. 3–4, p. 64 (63–70).
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We see this image not simply as a representation of something, but as an event, 
a process, an almost theatrical turn in which the image behaves in an unex-
pected manner, calling attention to its own production, making its appearance 
into a performance of image-ness, of becoming visual, of appearing.4
Similarly, later devices such as the phenakistiscope – a  rotating disc with 
a series of movement phases – “do not represent motion, they produce it.”5
While producing visual illusions, philosophical toys, according to Gunning, 
at the same time demonstrate the process that generates them and make it 
possible for us to understand how our senses function and how they inter-
act with the environment: they provide us with “rational entertainment.” 
Gunning adopts Crary’s historiographical model, situates the moment of 
emergence of the modern visual culture in the 1820s and exempli" es it with 
the thaumatrope. I am convinced we must look deeper than that.
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing wrote his short but remarkable fragment “# at 
more than " ve senses are possible for human beings” at the very close of 
his life, most likely in 1780. In several paragraphs, he outlines a conception 
of human development from simple forms to complex and advanced ones: 
human sensory apparatus is not " xed once and for all but evolves towards 
greater re" nement and complexity. Our present stage of " ve senses was 
achieved through combinatorics of individual ones: “If nature nowhere 
makes a leap, the soul will also have progressed through all the lower stages 
before it reached the stage at which it is at present. It will " rst have had each of 
these senses singly, then all ten combinations of two, all ten combinations of 
three, and all " ve combinations of four before it acquired all " ve together.”6
# e present combination is not, however, the " nal stage of development: 
senses determine the limits of the soul’s representations, they are their order 
and measure and the way the soul is conjoined with matter – the senses are 
themselves material. Matter, however, is not monolithic; it contains homo-
4 Tom GUNNING, “Hand and Eye: Excavating a New Technology of the Image in the Victorian 
Era.” Victorian Studies, vol. 54, 2012, no. 3, p. 510 (495–516).
5 Tom GUNNING, “# e Play between Still and Moving Images: Nineteenth-Century 
Philosophical Toys and # eir Discourse.” In: RØSSAAK, E. (ed.), Between Stillness and Motion. 
Film, Photography, Algorithms. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2011, p. 38 (27–43).
6 Gotthold Ephraim LESSING, “# at More than Five Senses Are Possible for Human Beings.”
Philosophical and ! eological Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005, p. 180
(180–183).
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geneous elements or masses that correspond to particular senses.7 Because
we know that there are more than ! ve homogeneous matters (although we 
cannot know for sure how many there are in the world altogether), we can 
assume more senses are possible:
" us, just as the sense of sight corresponds to the homogeneous mass through 
which bodies attain a condition of visibility (i.e. light), so also is it certain that 
particular senses can and will correspond, e.g., to electrical matter or magnetic 
matter, senses through which we shall immediately recognize whether bodies 
are in an electrical or magnetic state. We can at present attain this knowledge 
only by conducting experiments.8
Lessing illustrates his thesis with the classic motive of sensory impairment: 
if we lacked vision, for example, we would not be able to form any conception 
of it. A$ er gaining sight, a “whole new world will suddenly emerge for us, 
full of the most splendid phenomena.” In the same way, we are aware (thanks 
to scienti! c research) of the existence of electrical or magnetic powers but 
we cannot perceive them because we haven’t developed special senses for 
them yet. Human perception is dependent upon psychophysical constitu-
tion, which is not invariable.
Of course, Lessing does not speak in terms of purely biological evolu-
tion; his system is “the oldest of all philosophical systems,” the system of the 
soul’s pre-existence and of metempsychosis. " e idea of a process in which 
an immortal soul migrates into new complex beings was very popular in 
Lessing’s times and he himself developed it further in some of his other, later 
texts. Aside from a  rich tradition of metempsychosis speculation, Lessing 
was most likely inspired by Charles Bonnet’s theory of palingenesis.9
Bonnet was one of the ! rst authors to use the term evolution, although 
in a di% erent manner than it is known to us from the nineteenth century. His 
Leibnizian approach to evolution was marked by a belief in preformation, ac-
cording to which every living being encapsulates in itself a primordial seed, 
an unchanging miniature replica of itself that is activated at fertilization and 
7  In this regard, Lessing draws on the traditional assigning of particular senses to di% erent 
elements and simultaneously radicalizes his earlier and more famous notion of a  “suitable 
relation” between signs, their referents and modes of perception that will be discussed below.
8  LESSING, “" at More than Five Senses Are Possible.” p. 181.
9  Such is the contention of H. B. Nisbet in his introduction to LESSING, Philosophical and 
! eological Writings, p. 14. " e in& uence of Lessing’s close friend Condillac and his discussion
of the senses in the 1754 Treatise on the Sensations needs to be acknowledged as well; however, 
it is the progressive development found in Bonnet that provides the relevant framework.
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develops into new identical organisms. At the creation of earth, all future 
generations of living beings were embodied in these primordial germs and 
the breeding of new creatures is essentially the production of endless series 
of copies of a given species. Preformationism excludes change or variation 
in the later evolutionary sense. It is not, however, an entirely static system. 
In his Philosophical Palingenesis from 1769, Bonnet delineates an image of 
catastrophic revolutions that radically alter living conditions on Earth and 
lead to new rebirths. " e physical bodies of organisms are destroyed during 
these periodical catastrophes, but their germs survive and are born again 
into new worlds. " ese new worlds bring about di# erent living conditions 
from the preceding ones, which is the reason why organisms acquire new 
forms corresponding to these new environments. “I conceive that the germs 
of all organized beings were originally constructed or calculated with a de-
terminate correlation with the diverse revolutions which our globe was to 
undergo.”10 Catastrophic revolutions are predetermined just like the forms 
of the living are and they allow organisms to evolve towards greater biologi-
cal complexity and higher spiritual perfection.
Bonnet’s temporalizing of the chain of being does not involve the 
gradual transformation from simple to complex forms but proceeds rather 
by discontinuous leaps, a  general shi$ ing of all living beings and their 
hierarchical arrangements. During these phases, living beings constitute 
a continuous series, an uninterrupted chain of being that develops through
sequential revolutions of time:
" e series of events, however, is quite distinct from these spatial con% gurations, 
each of which describes the taxonomic continuity in its own way; the series of 
events is discontinuous, and di# erent in each of its episodes; but, as a whole, it 
can be drawn only as a simple line, which is that of time itself (and which can be 
conceived as straight, broken, or circular). In its concrete form, and in the depth 
that is proper to it, nature resides wholly between the fabric of the taxinomia
and the line of revolutions.11
Late eighteenth-century natural history historicizes nature by integrating 
a consecutive series with the continuity of living beings: “evolution” is still 
both a scienti% c and a theological term. It has to be reconciled with the be-
10 Quoted in Arthur O. LOVEJOY, ! e Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1936, p. 285.
11  Michel FOUCAULT, ! e Order of ! ings. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London –
New York: Routledge 2002, p. 163.
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lief in the immortality of the soul and preformation. ! e inner hierarchical 
structure is not a" ected by time; time is not the principle of the evolution 
of organisms and their organization in the sense of later evolutionism and 
transformism. For Bonnet, evolution is the unfolding of a pre-programmed 
course that determines the nature of organisms, their mutual relationships, 
as well as revolutions of the environment they inhabit.
Lessing’s fragment falls within this evolutionary framework, the 
development of the senses is understood as a  combination of individual 
senses and their aggregates, not as their gradual perfection. However, his 
examples of existing matter (electrical or magnetic), which cannot be im-
mediately perceived yet, must bring us to a halt. We gain knowledge of them 
by conducting experiments. It is due to scienti$ c experiments that invisible 
processes, powers and matters become manifest in various e" ects – and we 
can register these e" ects with our senses or detect them with diverse (mostly 
measuring) instruments. ! e discoveries of electrical, magnetic or galvanic 
phenomena in the eighteenth century were still closely connected to the 
belief of God’s presence in the world and they inspired radical changes in 
the understanding of the relationship between the body and soul or matter 
and spirit, when they replaced the traditional medieval metaphysics of light: 
“Magnetism and electricity emerged as the most palpable manifestation of 
the hidden presence of divine power in the world and its objects – as the 
concealed power that creates life, movement and warmth; that permeates 
the entire universe ...”12
Joseph Priestley, the author of a seminal survey of historical and con-
temporary electrical research from 1767, emphasizes the role causality plays 
in human cognition:
One of the most intimate of all associations in the human mind is that of cause
and e! ect. ! ey suggest one another with the utmost readiness upon all occa-
sions; so that it is almost impossible to contemplate the one, without having 
some idea of, or forming some conjecture about the other. In viewing the works 
of nature, we necessarily become $ rst acquainted with appearances or e" ects.13
Appearances and e" ects are extremely diverse; therefore, it is necessary to 
search for analogies among them and so explain them by a small number of 
12  Ernst BENZ, " e " eology of Electricity. On the Encounter and Explanation of " eology and 
Science in the 17th and 18th Centuries. Allison Park: Pickwick Publications 1989, p. 2.
13 Joseph PRIESTLEY," e History and Present State of Electricity, with Original Experiments. 
Vol. II. London 1775, p. 11.
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causes. An e! ect can become a true scienti# c phenomenon when it ceases to 
be only a particular event and becomes a regular and regulated one instead: 
it has to be made to appear every time under given circumstances and only 
then becomes a stabilized, observable phenomenon. Searching for analogies 
between appearances and producing them under identical and controlled 
conditions are the ways in which one establishes relationships between 
the large number and variety of visible e! ects and the few simple invisible 
causes. $ is principle is particularly distinct when studying electricity:
Indeed, no other part of the whole compass of philosophy a! ords so # ne a scene 
for ingenious speculation. Here the imagination may have full play, in con-
ceiving of the manner in which an invisible agent produces an almost in# nite 
variety of visible e! ects. As the agent is invisible, every philosopher is at liberty 
to make it whatever he pleases, and ascribe to it such properties and powers as 
are most convenient for his purpose. And, indeed, if he can frame this theory 
so as really to suit all the facts, it has all the evidence of truth that the nature of 
things can admit.14
$ e # rst experiments, which most commonly produced static electricity by 
friction, explained it in terms of gravitation, as a kind of attraction or repul-
sion intrinsic in speci# c bodies. “But when electricity began to show itself in 
a greater variety of appearances, and to make itself sensible to the smell, the 
sight, the touch, and the hearing: when bodies were not only attracted and 
repelled, but made to emit strong sparks of # re, attended with a considerable 
noise, a painful sensation, and a strong phosphoreal smell; electricians were 
obliged to make their systems more complex, in proportion as the facts were 
so.”15 In the last decades of the eighteenth century, electrical phenomena 
became even more complex when animal electricity was added to the reg-
ister. Investigations of the nature and speci# city of animal electricity and 
its similarity to static electricity produced arti# cially in laboratories (as we 
know them primarily from the Galvani–Volta dispute) were simultaneously 
an arena for speculations about the roles of analogy and metaphor in scien-
ti# c research.16
14 Ibid., p. 16.
15 Ibid., p. 18.
16 Cf. Marcello PERA, ! e Ambiguous Frog. ! e Galvani-Volta Controversy on Animal 
Electricity. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992 and Laura OTIS, “$ e Metaphoric 
Circuit: Organic and Technological Communication in the Nineteenth Century.” Journal of 
the History of Ideas, vol. 63, 2002, no. 1, pp. 105–128.
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Take the example of the electric shock that can be delivered by a torpedo 
" sh or an electric eel. In the Renaissance, it was still an inexplicable, occult 
phenomenon. In early modern times, it became the subject of more focused 
research and acquired mechanical explanation. # anks to the invention of 
the Leyden jar in 1745, a condenser able to store static electricity, one could 
perceive some similarity between the two e$ ects and consider the torpedo 
shock as electrical. Electricity, however, permeated the organic realm much 
more intensively once it began to be understood as a possible medium of 
communication in the nerves and when the emerging neurophysiology was 
still closely connected with physical and technical research. Even though 
explicit parallels between organic and technological systems would become 
commonplace in the next century, the preconditions for their intersections 
and interfacing (both conceptual and technical) emerged in Luigi Galvani’s 
lab, on a  table full of wires, condensers and dissected frog legs, which he 
himself regarded as the " nest existing electrometer. Scienti" c apparatus and 
the instrumental arrangements do not just serve the purpose of displaying 
the nature and functions of the subject matter; they also help to formulate 
the conceptual models and metaphors used to interpret these phenomena.17
# e core element of modern electrophysiology, beyond the more or less technical 
terms and concepts it makes use of, consists of the fact that the membrane of 
nerve and of muscle " bers is actually a “machine,” which produces and utilizes the 
electricity necessary to encode and transmit information to the excitable tissues.18
# e nature of electricity is revealed through its e$ ects and the phenom-
ena produced must be stabilized in certain ways so they can be compared 
one to another. One way is to measure them. A di$ erent method was discov-
ered in 1777 by Georg Christoph Lichetnberg, who found by chance another 
sensitive “tissue” that could be a$ ected by electricity. While working with 
his electrophore, Lichtenberg noticed how resin dust would settle in its base 
forms into peculiar patterns and he started to examine this more systemati-
cally: radial or circular patterns were thought to be the result of positive or 
negative electrical % uids. Lichtenberg compared them to macroscopic im-
ages – stars, milky ways, suns – or to the images brought forth by the frost 
on window-panes and referred to them as “projections.” He was also able to 
17  See Tomáš DVOŘÁK, “Scienti" c Instruments and Epistemology Engines.”! eory of Science, 
vol. 34, 2012, no. 4, pp. 529–540.
18  Marco PICCOLINO – Marco Bresadola, Shocking Frogs. Galvani, Volta, and the Electric 
Origins of Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 320.
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preserve them by spreading an adhesive substance on a sheet of black paper, 
thus discovering the principle of xerography.
" e electrophore generated an electrical charge and served as an auxiliary 
instrument for charging a Leyden jar – Lichtenberg decided to build a much 
larger version (with a diameter of over 2 meters, his older model’s diameter 
being around 45 centimeters) because “executing experiments with larger 
instruments is tantamount to observing the exhibited phenomena under a mi-
croscope: what went unnoticed beforehand to the most acute eye even with 
greatest scrutiny, can no longer remain forever unnoticed even by the sloppi-
est and most inconsiderate observer with the dullest sense once it is enlarged 
in this manner.”19 " anks to this substantial magni# cation of the power to
visualize an electrical charge (Lichtenberg was able to produce 40-centimeter-
long sparks), the electrophore became a much more sensitive instrument of 
detection and display that allowed even for “drawing” patterns or letters: 
a new kind of secret language allowed nature to make itself manifest. At the 
time, electrostatic # gures captured the attention of the public as analogies of 
atmospheric charges, thunderbolts harnessed and domesticated. Smaller ver-
sions of Lichtenberg’s instrument were soon on sale, philosophical toys that 
were meant to demonstrate and explain the emergence of frost patterns. " e 
principles behind these invisible processes were still unknown but thanks to 
the instrument they could be made visible, and release a lasting image of their 
transient state, a pregnant moment of their potentiality: “In the frozen state 
of a single image, the world is expressed as a speci# c state of tension.”20 Li-
chtenberg’s # gures are nature’s explosive gestures, indexical images that allow 
nature’s hidden forces to surface by means of the apparatus and to translate the 
haptic sensation of electric shock into a visual one. " ey are simultaneously 
beautiful and true ciphers, not yet fully understood but nevertheless able to 
insert certain degree of certainty into theoretical confusion and controver-
sies. " ese sonograms of modernity inaugurate an era of mediation that are 
characterized by the dialectical tension between movement and stillness and 
would develop into the forensic imagination we indulge in today.
It might seem surprising that Lichtenberg did not pursue a more thor-
ough explanation of his # gures or attempt to situate them within the system 
19 Quoted in: Davis BAIRD – Alfred NORDMANN, “Facts-Well-Put.”! e British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science, vol. 45, 1994, no. 1, p. 46 (37–77).
20  Siegfried ZIELINSKI, “Show and Hide: Projection as a Media Strategy Located between 
Proof of Truth and Illusionising.” In: ZIELINSKI, S. – WAGNERMAIER, S. M. (eds.), 
Variantology 1. On Deep Time Relations of Arts, Sciences and Technologies. Köln: Walther 
König 2005, p. 97 (81–100).
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of knowledge of the time. It was as if they could speak for themselves. Such an 
approach resonates with his other scienti! c and literary work: Lichtenberg 
favored experiment over theory as well as aphorism over novel. His method 
of presentation was based on a graphic and immediately e# ective apparition, 
shocking rather than contemplative. His anti-systematic approach led to the 
demonstration of knowledge in a condensed and concentrated form, not in 
a gradual and detailed interpretation or theoretical explication.21
When Lichtenberg introduced his electrostatic ! gures to the public 
in 1778 and when two years later Galvani began his series of experiments 
with dissected frogs, exposing them to static or atmospheric electricity, they 
contributed yet another fascinating images to the rich repertoire of electrical 
imagination of the eighteenth century.22 $ is imagination was not the exclu-
sive property of scientists, rather the opposite: ingeniously elaborated and 
spectacular demonstrations of electrical phenomena accompanied scienti! c 
lectures but also attracted customers to instrument shops, and became fash-
ionable parlor tricks and domestic amusement and were discussed in the 
periodical press as sensational events.
[N]atural philosophers could use their control over active powers to construct 
a theatre with all the appeal and all the dangers that implied. $ e theatrical
image, as an analogy for the world which was to be investigated, was common. 
$ e Linnaean disciples wrote of “the theatre of this life” and of the naturalist as 
“the eye and spirit of the Earth, attentive to gaze with astonishment upon the 
economy of the Creator”. $ ey emphasized that “one ! nds in Man two proper-
ties of which all other animals are deprived: astonishment and language.”23
21  $ e relationship between Lichtenberg’s scienti! c and literary work is discussed in Jürgen 
TEICHMANN, “Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: Experimental Physics from the Spirit of 
Aphorism.” Nuova Voltiana. Studies on Volta and his Times, vol. 5, 2003, pp. 15–30 and Jeremy 
ADLER, “Klikatá čára. Vizuální narativní metoda: Sterne, Lichtenberg, Novalis.” Kritický 
sborník, vol. 19, 1999/2000, pp. 65–82.
22  It is worth noting that both these discoveries, as well as many others at the time, are regarded 
as having occurred “by chance.” $ is interpretation stemmed from the lack of theoretical 
explanations for them and from the understanding of an experiment as a test of a theoretical 
hypothesis, which denies any kind of epistemological gain on the side of instrumental 
arrangement. In fact, similar discoveries occur only thanks to experimental systems that are 
not simply tools for generating answers but rather materialize questions and produce material 
entities along with concepts and theories; see Hans-Jörg RHEINBERGER, Toward a History 
of Epistemic # ings. Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
1997.
23 Simon SCHAFFER, “Natural Philosophy and Public Spectacle in the Eighteenth Century.” 
History of Science, vol. 21, 1983, no. 1, p.  14 (1–43). $ e role of instrument makers and
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In scienti! c experiments, the controlled production of a phenomenon 
and wonder went hand in hand; eighteenth-century science did not know 
the future di# erentiations between professionals and amateurs, academic 
institutions and market, work and amusement. It was in the next century, 
when science was “puri! ed” of popular, entertaining, commercial – in short, 
non-scienti! c – activities, and this process of puri! cation was a way of le-
gitimizing its new social role and status.24 Epistemological dramas that were
performed in the theatres of nature of the eighteenth century were, above 
all, entertaining and educational visual spectacles. $ ey accounted for the 
di# erent regime of visuality that was assigned to the period by authors like 
Foucault or Jacob: for Foucault, theatre is the model of Renaissance visuality 
and it is substituted in the Classical period by the table and the catalogue; 
according to Jacob, the eighteenth century is de! ned by a search for “vis-
ible structure”, “reducing a living being to its visible aspect and translating 
its shape, size, colour and movement into words.”25 Both authors focused 
primarily on natural history; it is true that public demonstrations were 
dominated by the physical and mechanical sciences, but alongside light, 
electricity, magnetism and various automata, minerals, plants, corpses and 
monsters were also put on display. $ e way they were exhibited was very dif-
ferent from the Renaissance regime of curiosity, because it became a public 
and commercialized enterprise. Instead of totally displacing theatricality, 
we should look for moments where both modes of observation overlap and 
supplement one another while avoiding their subsumption under some 
monolithic and normative framework: in every period, we can ! nd a num-
ber of coexisting heterogeneous scienti! c cultures with frayed edges. On 
the one hand, they allow for and inspire mutual exchanges of concepts and 
metaphors, the sharing of methods of research and instrumental equipment, 
the creation of analogies between disparate phenomena and hints of univer-
sal systems; on the other they also produce moments of cognitive dissonance 
and provoke discursive, disciplinary or institutional battles.
itinerant lecturers in both the presentation and research of electricity is discussed in 
Oliver HOCHADEL, “A  Shock to the Public: Itinerant Lecturers and Instrument Makers 
as Practitioners of Electricity in the German Enlightenment (1740–1800).” Nuova Voltiana.
Studies on Volta and his Times, vol. 5, 2003, pp. 53–67.
24  See Bernadette BENSAUDE-VINCENT – Christine BLONDEL (eds.), Science and Spectacle 
in the European Enlightenment. Aldershot: Ashgate 2008.
25  François JACOB, ! e Logic of Life. A History of Heredity. New York: Pantheon Books 1973, 
p. 45.
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Making the invisible visible or rather making the imperceptible percepti-
ble by some sort of mediation is one of the concerns shared across many 
di! erent " elds and disciplines. It was within aesthetics that questions of 
mediation were posed in the most pronounced and profound ways, espe-
cially in the works of Lessing. His Laocoön from 1766 is a critique of the
classical doctrine of ut pictura poesis, an understanding of painting as mute 
poetry and poetry as a speaking picture. Lessing proceeds from the di! er-
ent ways identical situation is rendered in these media: Vergil’s epic poem 
Aeneid and the ancient sculptural group Laocoön and His Sons from the 
" rst century BC. Laocoön was a Trojan priest, punished for attempting to 
expose the ruse of the Trojan Horse (according to the most common inter-
pretation). Poseidon sent sea snakes to kill him and his sons and the group 
of the three su! ering " gures with snakes wrapped around and su! ocating 
them is taken to be the prototypical icon of human agony. Lessing is puz-
zled by the expression in Loacoön’s face – unlike the poetic rendition, the 
sculpture does not portray the most extreme moment of pain and su! ering 
because that would have been a violation of the classical ideal of beauty. 
$ e artistic medium therefore determines to a certain extent what can be 
represented and how. We should note, however, that a  strong normative 
claim is present here; in fact it is not the very material limits of individual 
media, as many interpreters of Lessing the semiotician claim, but rather 
a  required form of expression. Technically speaking, the sculpture could 
represent the situation in a  di! erent way as well but then it wouldn’t 
ful" ll Lessing’s preferred conventions and ideals. In the same way, the 
critique of ut pictura poesis is directed against excessive descriptiveness
and staticness of poetry; “good” poetry should follow its medium-speci" c 
principles.
$ ere were many discussions of the relationships between artistic media 
before Lessing, his originality, however, lies in the reduction of this di! erence 
to the fundamental distinction between temporal and spatial principles. $ e 
succession of time is the sphere of the poet and space is that of the painter:
In the " rst place I presume it will scarcely admit of dispute that the imitations 
of painting are e! ected by means entirely di! erent from those of poetry; the 
former employing " gures and colors in space, and the latter articulate sounds 
in time. Now, as it is evident that the signs employed must bear a suitable rela-
tion to the things represented, it follows that those signs which are arranged 
in juxta-position with each other, can only express co-existent objects, or an 
object whose parts are co-existent, while those signs which are consecutive, can 
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only express things which, either of themselves, or in their component parts, 
are consecutive.26
Lessing further distinguishes between primary and secondary or direct and 
indirect expression: painting can represent actions by intimation, by means 
of bodies, and poetry may also delineate bodies by means of actions. ! us 
expressing juxtaposition by poetry or consecutiveness by painting is not im-
possible, it is only more complicated and strenuous and demands more e" ort 
from the recipient. ! e crucial criterion here is, simply, the e" ectiveness of 
generating a full and vigorous illusion. In the ideal situation we even stop 
perceiving the means that bring it to life:
! e poet seeks to render the ideas which he awakens within us so vivid, that we 
may instantly fancy we perceive the real and sensible impressions of the objects 
they refer to; and, in that moment of illusion, we cease to be conscious of his 
words, that is to say, of the means by which he produces his e" ect.27
If poetry is speci$ cally temporal, it produces its own speci$ c temporality: in 
that moment of acceleration necessary to generate the desired deception, it 
breaks up with the pace of human perception, falls below the threshold of 
consciousness and becomes a machine for producing special e" ects. When 
Lessing talks about actions and their consecutiveness, he does not refer only 
to some general conception of time or movement but rather to human action 
and the e" ort, activity, work it entails.
! ose combined e" ects which the eye perceives at a glance, [the poet] is obliged 
to enumerate in tedious detail, and it not unfrequently happens that by the time 
we arrive at the last of his traits, we have already forgotten the $ rst. Neverthe-
less, it is from these successive traits alone that we can form any conception of 
the whole. To the eye, the parts contemplated remain constantly present, and 
may be recurred to over and over again; on the contrary, when the ear is the 
channel of perception, the parts described are lost, if they are not preserved in 
the memory. And even supposing them to be all correctly remembered, – what 
an e" ort, what an exertion would it require to revive their impressions all in the 
26 Gotthold Ephraim LESSING, Laocoon; or the Limits of Poetry and Painting. London: 
J. Ridgway & Sons 1836, p. 150.
27 Ibid., p. 165. ! e English translation uses the word “instantly” instead of speed or rapidity, 
which would more precisely translate “die Geschwindigkeit” – thanks to the speed of sensory 
impressions we believe we perceive the real objects.
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same order and with the same distinctness, and to think them over again with 
even moderate rapidity, so as to form a tolerable idea of the whole!28
" e e# ort, exertion and time needed have to be passed on to the mechanism 
that produces the synthesis for us. Leibniz was pondering the idea that eyes 
of su$  cient acuity might read all the relations in space and time within the 
“present;” that idea is realized here, although on a much smaller scale, in 
the appropriately structured artifact and its coordination with the human 
sensorium: artworks are phantasmagorical projections, we are not aware 
of the processes that generate illusions because they take place below the 
threshold of our consciousness.
Lessing’s re% ections are most fruitful when they focus on possible viola-
tions of laid down principles (such as the treatment of indirect, “unsuitable” 
modes of expression). " ese moments also uncover the most problematic 
of his assumptions and his normative requirements. Producing an e# ective 
illusion is predicated on two levels of abstraction: the & rst step is based on 
the very di# erentiation between painting and poetry and their respective 
inner principles, coexistence and sequentiality, space and time. " e second 
one results from what media with such a bias – according to their material 
limits – may choose to represent from the space-time continuum.
" e painter can only employ, in his compositions of co-existing bodies, one 
single moment of the action, and he must therefore select, as far as possible, that 
which is at once expressive of the past, and pregnant with the future.
In like manner the poet, in his consecutive imitations, can employ but one sin-
gle attribute of bodies, and must therefore select that which awakens the most 
sensible image of the body under that particular aspect which he has chosen to 
represent.29
" e reality e# ects postulated by the emerging science of aesthetics are based 
on the sequential isolation of these elements and their resulting combina-
tion. In this respect, Lessing proceeds in union with the methods of natural 
sciences of the time. “Observation,” writes Foucault, “from the seventeenth 
century onward, is a perceptible knowledge furnished with a series of sys-
tematically negative conditions.” It advances via reduction and selection of 
phenomena that can be further analyzed and made generally acceptable: 
“" e area of visibility in which observation is able to assume its powers is 
28 Ibid., pp. 166–7.
29 Ibid., p. 152.
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thus only what is le!  a! er these exclusions [...] " is area, much more than the 
receptivity and attention at last being granted to things themselves, de# nes 
natural history’s condition of possibility, and the appearance of its screened 
objects: lines, surfaces, forms, reliefs.” Foucault hurries to emphasize that 
optical instruments such as a microscope fall within such regime of visuality 
as well: “it was the same complex of negative conditions that limited the 
realm of experience and made the use of optical instruments possible.”30
" e main di% erence lies in the fact that the aesthetic sphere is interested 
in the creation of artifacts that produce anticipated e% ects. " is di% erence is, 
however, only a misrepresentation based on our contemporary perspective: 
we tend to view various spheres of knowledge and experience separately as 
subject matters of individual # elds and under the in& uence of traditional 
historiography of science understand the history of knowledge mainly as 
the history of ideas and theories. In fact, experimental science and aesthet-
ics share many fundamental concerns: recall Lichtenberg # gures in case of 
which any separation of truth and beauty is impossible and pointless. " ey 
are not a re& ection or a representation but rather a discharge, which would 
quickly become the prime concern of Romanticism. Romantic aesthetics 
would treat it # rst of all in psychological terms, as the excessive pressure 
of the author’s emotions, and thus suppressing its bonds with the ways the 
world appears in scienti# c experiments. " e more Romanticism wanted to 
bring forward a critique or an alternative to the experience of rationalization 
and industrialization, the more it lost the ability to understand this new ex-
pressive form in its wholeness and complexity. " e “mirror” and the “lamp”, 
the metaphors analyzed by Abrams as the dominant models of mind and 
creative processes in the Classical period and in Romanticism,31 are always 
simultaneously material technologies, cognitive extensions that are located 
outside of the human body but de# ne it and its abilities and partake in their 
development. Any conception of a bare human subject and its inner vision 
is but a strained abstraction. " e lamp of Romanticism is an electric lamp 
and it was electri# ed decades before Kant or Coleridge. " e pivotal aspect of 
modern explosive aesthetics is then found in Lessing.
If apparition illuminates and touches, the image is the paradoxical e% ort to 
trans# x this most evanescent instant. In art something momentary transcends; 
objectivation makes the artwork into an instant. Pertinent here is Benjamin’s 
30  FOUCAULT,! e Order of ! ings, pp. 144–5.
31  Meyer Howard ABRAMS, ! e Mirror and the Lamp. Romantic ! eory and the Critical 
Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1953.
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formulation of a dialectic at a standstill, which he developed in the context of 
his conception of a dialectical image. If, as images, artworks are the persistence 
of the transient, they are concentrated in appearance as something momentary. 
To experience art means to become conscious of its immanent process as an 
instant at a standstill; this may perhaps have nourished the central concept of 
Lessing’s aesthetics, that of the “pregnant moment.”32
Lessing formulates his conception of the pregnant moment in the beginning 
of his essay, long before the rigid di" erentiation of time-based and space-
based media and modes of perception appears. It emerges when he discusses 
the problem of Laocoön’s facial expression, the question of why the sculpture 
does not portray the most extreme state of the priest’s pain and su" ering. It 
is not just a matter of aesthetic conventions. If the visual arts are to choose 
one particular moment for depiction, they must select the appropriate one:
If it be true that the artist can adopt from the face of ever-varying nature only 
so much of her mutable e" ects as will belong to one single moment, and the 
painter, in particular, can seize this single moment only under one solitary 
point of view; – if it be true also that his works are intended, not to be merely 
glanced at, but to be long and repeatedly examined; – then it is clear that the 
great di#  culty will be to select such a moment and such a point of view as 
shall be su#  ciently pregnant with meaning. Nothing however can possess this 
important quali$ cation but that which leaves free scope to the imagination. 
% e sight and the fancy must be permitted reciprocally to add to each other’s 
enjoyment.33
Here, the later claim for maximal e" ectiveness is somewhat denied: it is 
not a matter of overlooking the image at once, seeing it in one instant, but 
rather a question of creating an interface in which the viewer is animated 
by the image and the image animated by the viewer. % e last sentence of the 
excerpt is translated very loosely. It really reads: “% e more we see, the more 
we must be able to imagine; and the more we add in our imagination, the 
more we must believe we see.” In condensed form, Lessing captures the basic 
principle of the emergence of the illusion, the linking of human sensorium 
and its extensions that form their coordinated complicity: a speci$ c kind of 
technical imagination. In the pregnant moment being appears in its process 
of becoming something, it is both static and dynamic and thus addresses our 
32  % eodor W. ADORNO, Aesthetic ! eory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 84.
33 LESSING, Laocoon, pp. 28–9.
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a! ective and cognitive processes that simultaneously trust it and let them-
selves be deceived. Di! erent layers of our minds and bodies participate in 
this paradoxical tangle of trust, seeing and imagination: the human being 
is divided into segments that in di! erent ways and in di! erent measures 
respond to speci" cally structured stimuli. # e doctrine of the separation of 
the senses is a precondition of the establishment of aesthetics as developed by 
Lessing or Diderot. # e major texts of Enlightenment theory are imminently 
interested in the capacities and limits of medial transmission and sensory ap-
paratus – that is why various forms of sensory deprivation play such a crucial 
role in these discussions. # rough them, restrictions can be delineated and 
combinatory possibilities envisioned. It is not a matter of a perfection of the 
senses but rather of a prosthetic overwriting of their capacities and capabili-
ties, a whole new architecture in which corporeality is provisionally and par-
tially synchronized with various supplements and assistive technologies. # is 
coordinated rearrangement has a speci" c dynamic that is most pertinently 
developed in Moses Mendelssohn’s reaction to Lessing’s Laocoön.
Following Jean-Baptiste Dubos, Mendelssohn asks why looking at 
sorrow, pain and misery can bring us pleasure and satisfaction. Bull" ghts, 
racks, insane asylums, bloody sca! oldings for execution, these are his exam-
ples of things we would prefer not to feel than to feel – peculiar mixtures of 
appreciation and rejection. De" ciencies and evils are immediately undesir-
able but in mediated form can be good and pleasant. If we perceive them, for 
example, in the form of artworks, our “secret consciousness” (ein heimliches 
Bewusstsein) reminds us that we have only an imitation before our eyes and 
thus moderates the strength of the objective disgust:
It is true, the soul’s sentient knowledge and capacities to desire are deceived by 
art and the imagination is so swept away that at times we forget every sign that 
it is an imitation and fancy that we truly see nature. But this magic lasts only as 
long as it is necessary to give our conception of the object the proper vitality and 
" re. In order to have the most pleasure, we have accustomed ourselves to divert-
ing attention from everything that could disturb the deception and directing 
attention only at what sustains it. However, as soon as the relation to the object 
begins to become unpleasant, a thousand factors remind us that we are looking 
at a mere imitation.34
34  Moses MENDELSSOHN, “Rhapsody or Additions to the Letters on Sentiments.” In: 
Philosophical Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 138 (131–168).
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In the interest of maximum pleasure the soul plays a speci" c energetic game 
in which the controlled experience of immersion, of loosing oneself in the 
projected world, temporarily dominates, only to be turned o#  once a critical 
state is reached. Mendelssohn anticipates Coleridge’s concept of the “willing 
suspension of disbelief” but frames it in a much more sophisticated fashion. 
In his account, the concept of attention understood in terms of practice 
and acquired habit is crucial. Not everyone enjoys dramatic tragedies. We 
have to be accustomed to such experience, for which “a certain re" nement is 
required.” Whoever is not accustomed to it feels bored or experiences a con-
$ ict – sometimes annoying, sometimes ridiculous – between his reason and 
his imagination.
For Mendelssohn, the problem of pleasure from sorrowful spectacles is 
an ethical rather than an aesthetic problem. He recalls Plato’s concept of 
virtue and the di# erence between speculative and pragmatic knowledge. 
If virtue is a certain kind of knowledge, it can be learned and acquired by 
repeatedly practicing skills and habits. It is not a  theoretical, verbalizable 
knowledge, a knowledge we can be aware of, but exactly the opposite: our 
capabilities are transformed into pro" ciency only when we cease to be con-
scious of them. % ey have to stream through our blood, get under our skin, 
become automatic, become habitual. % e principle of such automation is, 
again, speed:
For what causes consciousness to stop? % e quickness with which concepts suc-
ceed one another. % us, although the degree of our knowledge is lessened by the 
lack of consciousness, the quantity of e# ective impulses remains the same in 
this case. For what is lost in the degree of knowledge is gained in the shortness 
of the time or in the quickness.35
% e e# ectiveness of representation depends on three factors: 1) the de-
gree of the perfection of the representation; 2) the degree of our knowledge; 
3) the speed with which we ponder matters. % e less time we need to consider 
the perfection presented to us, the more pleasant our intuitive knowledge is, 
and the more passionately we desire to enjoy it. % e speed of our intuitive 
insight compensates for the fact that we are not fully aware of it. “% is ex-
plains how, without thinking about it, we can perform a number of habitual 
actions which in the beginning required deliberations and re$ ection. What 
array of automatic movements are part of speaking and writing? How slowly 
and deliberately they proceed in the beginning and how quickly they follow 
35  MENDELSSOHN, “Rhapsody,” p. 163.
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upon one another, o! en unconscious to ourselves, once we have achieved 
a pro# ciency in this regard.”36 Mendelssohn further analyzes the process of 
automation with the examples of a pianist or a  typesetter; it does not just 
apply to mechanical activities but also fundamentally concerns the modes of 
perception and cognition mediated by artifacts and the formation of the hu-
man subject in modernity as such. Unlike the more or less isolated moments 
of aesthetic experience in Lessing, Mendelssohn conceives of these intervals 
and situations as components of the gradual constitution and reconstitution 
of human nature.
Virtue is, to be sure, a science and can be learned; but if it is be carried out, then 
it demands not merely scienti# c conviction, but also artful practice and pro# -
ciency. Indeed, anyone who grapples with the highest stage of ethical perfection 
and strives for the blessed condition of bringing the subordinate powers of the 
soul into a perfect harmony with the superior powers of the soul, must do this 
with the laws of nature just as the artist must do so with the rules of his art. He 
must continue practicing until, in the course of the exercise, he is no longer 
conscious of his rules, in other words, until his principles have turned into 
inclinations and his virtue appears to be more natural instinct than reason.37
$ e planes of instinct, intuition or habit are formed by di% erent rules and
principles than rational and theoretically expressed convictions are; because 
they are saturated with material practices and techniques and have to deal 
with their a% ordances and relatively autonomous development. If we want 
to conceptualize the transformation of experience and to historicize forms 
of perception and cognition, we cannot make do with just the development 
of philosophical, scienti# c or aesthetic systems. On the contrary, we need 
to descend onto levels traditionally regarded as low and subordinate. Just 
like Walter Benjamin did with his concept of distraction, which essentially 
refers to habit realized through tactile reception: “For the tasks which face 
the human apparatus of perception at historical turning points cannot be 
performed solely by optical means – that is, by way of contemplation. $ ey 
are mastered gradually – taking their cue from tactile reception – through 
habit.”38
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 166.
38  Walter BENJAMIN, “$ e Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.” In: 
Selected Writings. Vol. 4, 1938–1940. Cambridge, MA – London: $ e Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press 2003, p. 268.
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In the ! rst paragraph of his seminal essay, Benjamin alludes to the mul-
tiplicity and diversity of logics and temporalities of technical and organic 
segments that continuously combine one with another and rearrange and 
get used to themselves: lithography, invented by Senefelder in 1796,39 made it 
possible to reproduce images in much larger numbers and at a much quicker 
pace, thus providing an illustrated accompaniment to everyday life. A few 
decades later, lithography was surpassed by photography, which for the ! rst 
time “freed the hand from the most important artistic tasks in the process of 
pictorial reproduction – tasks that now devolved solely upon the eye looking 
into a lens. And since the eye perceives more swi# ly than the hand can draw, 
the process of pictorial reproduction was enormously accelerated, so that it 
could now keep pace with speech. A cinematographer shooting a scene in 
the studio captures the images at the speed of an actor’s speech.”40 Manual 
labor, skilled gestures, machines and instruments, speech, sight, hearing, 
touch, technical images, sound recordings – apparatus and organs combine 
and group together in changing clusters and constellations that give rise 
to historically speci! c cultural techniques and practices; these provisional 
arrangements are simultaneously determined by political and economical 
preferences of the time.
$ e accounts of philosophical toys mentioned in the introduction agree 
that one of their characteristic aspects is the disclosure of the processes si-
multaneously examined and experienced: “A crucial feature of these optical 
devices of the 1830s and 1840s is the undisguised nature of their operational 
structure and the form of subjection they entail.”41 Gunning develops
this point most thoroughly, in my opinion as a  consequence of his e% ort 
to debunk the myth of early cinema’s passive and helpless audience.42 $ e 
spectators of philosophical toys are entertained yet at the same time actively 
participate in the process and rationally engage in a quasi-scienti! c experi-
mental instruction. Scienti! c curiosity is thus made public and transferred 
to lay consumers: “in contrast to the traditional magic trick, whose illusion 
remains mysterious because the secret is kept close by the prestidigitator, 
39 Senefelder developed lithography while searching for a cheaper and more e% ective way of 
distributing his dramatic works; see Alois SENEFELDER, ! e Invention of Lithography. New 
York: $ e Fuchs & Lang Manufacturing Company 1911.
40  BENJAMIN, “$ e Work of Art,” p. 253.
41 CRARY, Techniques of the Observer, p. 132.
42 See Tom GUNNING, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous 
Spectator.” Art and Text, vol. 34, 1989, pp. 31–45.
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the philosophical toy is a  tool of demonstration and demysti" cation [...] 
# e philosophical toy sought to demystify magical e$ ects and unveil the 
secrets of perception and technology to the masses.”43 I  think that this is
an overly idealistic interpretation of the technological imagination, which 
cannot hold up even in reference to the simplest possible devices such as the 
thaumatrope was.
Gunning vigorously opposes the traditional view that the composite im-
age of the thaumatrope derives from a “fallacy” of the human eye – similar 
arguments of such de" ciency or weakness of human senses surround dis-
cussions of later animation devices or cinema: it is because the eye is not 
capable of perceiving rapid change that we actually see the virtual image 
instead of a series of still images. Referring to sensory insu%  ciency, accord-
ing to Gunning, reveals a prejudice towards perception as a static process. 
We should rather embrace its mobile possibilities and praise our senses’ abil-
ity to participate in the creation of similar phenomena. Gunning attempts to 
resolve this dilemma by embracing a phenomenological standpoint, which, 
in e$ ect, seems to be more of an evasive maneuver:
My position is obviously phenomenological; that is, I maintain that perceptions 
need not be dissolved into their physiological process (I  am not against do-
ing this – if we are studying physiology rather than moving images). But my 
task here is to describe our perception as we experience it. # e riddle of the 
perception of the moving image lies in the fact that no one can explain it purely 
physiologically and the physiological explanations are still debated. In other 
words, we have a true challenge to explanation here.44
Indeed, we still do not fully understand all the subtleties of the physiological 
process of perception; so what exactly is it that the viewer of a philosophical 
toy is instructed about? What kinds of secrets are unveiled, what operational 
structures are demonstrated? None really. No one can explain this process 
in purely physiological terms simply because it is not a purely physiologi-
cal process. If we take seriously Gunning’s claim that human perception 
undergoes a fundamental transformation based on a deep coordination of 
the perceptual and the technological, we also have to acknowledge the fact 
that the technological is a relatively autonomous and largely unknown ter-
ritory – though this in no way precludes us having an intimate relationship 
with it. We can see without fully understanding our senses and we can also 
43  GUNNING, “Hand and Eye,” pp. 503, 509.
44  GUNNING, “# e Play between Still and Moving Images,” p. 39.
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see mediated, virtual images without fully understanding the principles of 
their genesis. We are happy to delegate time and labor needed for perceptual 
and cognitive tasks on technological processes that take place below our 
consciousness or beyond the con! nes of our bodies. " e phenomenologi-
cal description is obviously a  legitimate one, but I believe that the crucial 
lesson philosophical toys provide us with is the glimpse they o$ er of the 
appearance of a very intricate and volatile cohabitation that can be most 
productively addressed within the framework of extended cognition. " is 
concept seeks to overcome the residual Cartesianism in our understanding 
of human cognition that draws a dividing line between the “thinking thing” 
and the “extended thing”, criticizes traditional mentalist and propositional 
conceptions of knowledge, and argues for the inclusion of the material envi-
ronment into cognitive and perceptual processes and activities. " is is not to 
say only that artifacts, instruments or media somehow amplify human cog-
nition, but rather that the dividing line between human and non-human is 
redrawn with respect to what constitutes a cognitive process. Such a process 
then cannot be limited to the human brain or human body since material 
objects in the environment function as parts of our mind or sensory ap-
paratus and together constitute coupled systems and assemblages that need 
to be acknowledged on their own if we are to adequately understand our 
knowledge-making processes. Neural, bodily, material and social resources 
need to be addressed simultaneously since material artifacts establish an 
external connection between our motor, visuo-spatial, and conceptual sys-
tems, thus creating dynamic experimental spaces within which knowledge 
and perception is processed and constituted. If we delegate certain tasks to 
technological agents, we need to acknowledge the fact that we are not able 
to fully control and o% en even understand them in a re& exive and rational 
manner:
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent 
people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of 
thinking of what we are doing. " e precise opposite is the case. Civilization ad-
vances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform 
without thinking about them.45
45 Alfred North WHITEHEAD, An Introduction to Mathematics. New York: Henry Holt & 
Co. 1911, p. 61.
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